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ABSTRACT
Generative classifiers have been shown promising to detect illegal inputs includ-
ing adversarial examples and out-of-distribution samples. Supervised Deep Info-
max (SDIM) is a scalable end-to-end framework to learn generative classifiers.
In this paper, we propose a modification of SDIM termed SDIM-logit. Instead
of training generative classifier from scratch, SDIM-logit first takes as input the
logits produced any given discriminative classifier, and generate logit representa-
tions; then a generative classifier is derived by imposing statistical constraints on
logit representations. SDIM-logit could inherit the performance of the discrimi-
native classifier without loss. SDIM-logit incurs a negligible number of additional
parameters, and can be efficiently trained with base classifiers fixed. We per-
form classification with rejection, where test samples whose class conditionals
are smaller than pre-chosen thresholds will be rejected without predictions. Ex-
periments on illegal inputs, including adversarial examples, samples with common
corruptions, and out-of-distribution (OOD) samples show that allowed to reject a
portion of test samples, SDIM-logit significantly improves the performance on the
left test sets.
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the great success of neural network models, they are also surprisingly vulnerable to ille-
gal inputs, like adversarial examples and samples with common corruptions. So model robustness
emerge as a big concern. The hardness to achieve robustness lies in that statistical machine learning
models, based on IID assumption, are asked to robustly make predictions on inputs deviated from
the training distribution due to adversarial perturbations or corruptions. Considering the unsatisfying
situation, an alternative treatment to these deviated inputs is rejection without prediction. Another
strong and practical motivation of rejection is the existence of out-of-distribution (OOD) samples.
For example, what should a classifier trained on ImageNet2012 do to a test sample outside of the
1000 training classes? Obviously, a robust classifier should output rejection, while current models
give a prediction inside the training classes.
Supervised Deep Infomax (SDIM,WANG & Yiu (2020)) is an end-to-end framework to learn gener-
ative classifiers on data representations, and maximize the mutual information between data and data
representations at the same time. SDIMs are able to achieve same-level performance as comparable
discriminative classifiers. With SDIM, class conditionals based classification with rejection can be
performed to effectively reject illegal inputs, including OOD samples and Lp adversarial examples.
In this paper, we propose SDIM-logit, a simple modification of SDIM. SDIM-logit is designed to
derive a generative classifier given any discriminative classifier. The only difference from SDIM is
that SDIM-logit takes the logits of the discriminative classifier as inputs, rather than the raw data.
The theoretical contribution of SDIM-logit is zero, but it brings following practical benefits:
• SDIM-logit enables us to derive generative classifier given any discriminative classifier
almost without loss of performance, incurring a negligible number of additional parameters,
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
00
48
3v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
 Ja
n 2
02
0
and training time. We could reuse the many powerful well-trained discriminative models
without training from scratch.
• We perform classification with rejection in SDIM-logit. For each class, one threshold of
class conditional is chosen. An input will be rejected if its maximum of class condition-
als is smaller than the corresponding threshold. Illegal inputs, include corrupted inputs,
adversarial examples, OOD samples can be effectively rejected.
Difference of Treatment The big difference between classification with rejection and methods
aiming to inherently improve models’ recognition robustness lies in the difference of treatment to
potential illegal inputs. For example, the implicit motivation behind adversarial training is that model
should be able to recognize adversarial examples. While for classification with rejection, illegal
inputs like adversarial examples are illegal inputs deviated from the training distribution, and should
be rejected without prediction. The consequence of attain recognition robustness may be that we
have to tackle different illegal inputs separately, and defense mechanisms call for additional designs
and training, even independent of the original target model (Song et al., 2017; Samangouei et al.,
2018). It is observed that Gaussian noise corruption is highly related to adversarial examples, and
both the adversarial and corruption robustness communities are encouraged to work more closely
together (Ford et al., 2019). See section 3.1 for a more comprehensive list of related works. The stark
advantage of SDIM-logit, also SDIM, is that its classification with rejection as defense mechanism
is a built-in property, and universally applicable to various illegal inputs.
2 SDIM-logit
Let f(x) denote logits (before softmax) of a discriminative classifier. SDIM-logit consists of three
components: logit encoderEφ, MI evaluation network Tω , and C-way embedding layer of Gaussian
class conditionals. The framework is summarized in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: SDIM-logit framework. (1)The encoder Eφ takes as inputs the logits f(x), and produces
global representationsEφ(f(x)). The MI between logits f(x) and global representationsEφ(f(x))
is maximized. (2) Supervised constraints are imposed on the global representations Eφ(f(x)) for
generative classification.
Maximize MI The MI evaluation network Tω maps positive pairs and negative pairs to MI scores
specified by corresponding MI lower-bound. Negative pairs are simply obtained by combine all
unpaired ones within the same mini-batch. Equivalently, we minimize the following loss JMI:
JMI = −I˜(f(x), E(f(x))), (1)
2
where I˜ is some specific lower-bound of MI (see WANG & Yiu (2020); Hjelm et al. (2018) for more
details).
Generative Classification Supervised constraints are imposed on the global representations x˜ =
Eφ(x) with loss JNLL + JLM for generative classification (WANG & Yiu, 2020). The true class
conditionals are maximized, while false class conditionals are minimized.
We end up with minimizing the following loss:
JSDIM-logit = α · JMI + β · JNLL + γ · JLM, (2)
where α, β, γ are scaling factors.
Classification with Rejection Normally, the classifier should output the class label y∗ that max-
imizes class conditional probability of test sample x∗. Here, we add a rejection option by setting a
threshold for each class conditional probability distribution, and define our decision function with
rejection as: {
y∗, if log p(x∗|y∗) ≥ δy∗
Rejection, otherwise
(3)
The model gives a rejection when log p(x∗|y∗) is smaller than the threshold δy∗ of class y∗.
3 RELATED WORKS
3.1 IMPROVING ROBUSTNESS ON VARIOUS ILLEGAL INPUTS
Adversarial Examples Adversarial training improves the adversarial robustness of victim models,
but could incur even more computations than traditional training due to the necessity to generate
adversarial examples. A line of works aim to accelerate adversarial training (Wong et al., 2020;
Qin et al., 2019). Adversarial training can result in performance degradation on clean test sets.
Recently, AdvProp (Xie et al., 2019) first solve this problem by using a separate batch norm for
adversarial examples, considering the underlying distribution of them is already deviated from the
normal training one.
OOD Samples Ren (2019) find that the likelihood of an image is dominated by the irrelevant
background statistics. They propose to train a background model, and correct with the ratio between
original likelihood and background likelihood. These works tend to solve one type of illegal inputs
individually, and not applicable to others.
3.2 GENERATIVE MODELING FOR CLASSIFICATION ROBUSTNESS
Generative Classifiers on Raw Data Deep generative models have achieved great successes in
synthesising realistic samples. So they can be great candidates to model the class conditional prob-
abilities p(x|y) required for generative classifiers. However, it is far from achieving comparable
classification performance to the discriminative counterparts.Li et al. (2018); Schott et al. (2018);
Fetaya et al. (2019) explore the adversarial robustness of fully generative classifiers, they all only
get satisfying accuracy on MNIST and hardly achieve acceptable classification performance even
on CIFAR10. They can demonstrate counter-intuitive behaviours, and assign surprisingly higher
likelihoods to OOD samples (Nalisnick et al., 2018; Choi & Jang, 2018).
Generative Classifiers on Data Representations Lee et al. (2020) propose deep learning objec-
tive to learn the multi-class generative classifier, by fusing the concept of Gaussian discriminant
analysis with DNNs directly. It shares some similarity to the supervised constraints of SDIM-logit,
but SDIM-logit ensure the quality of learned representations by maximizing JMI. Their evaluations
are particularly on OOD detection, while ours are on various illegal inputs that may deviate from
training distribution.
3
4 EXPERIMENTS
In our experiments, we choose ResNet18 (He et al., 2016) and ResNeXt-29 4 × 64d (Xie et al.,
2016) as the base discriminative classifiers. The code 1 is open sourced for reproduction. Then we
derive generative classifiers from the base classifiers with SDIM-logit. SDIM-logit introduces 12k
additional parameters, which is negligible compared to the base model, which has 21M parameters.
During the training, the base models are fixed, and only the introduced parameters of SDIM-logit
are trainable. The experiments aim to show that: (1) the training of SDIM-logit is computationally
efficient, and the derived generative classifiers inherit the performance of base classifiers without
observed losses; (2) We perform classification with rejection based on class conditionals of derived
generative classifiers.
Efficient Training All SDIM-logit models in our experiments are trained in 40 epochs using 1
Nvidia 1080 Ti GPU, and it takes only 20s for ResNet18 and 80s for ResNeXt-29 per epoch.
Choice of thresholds Following (WANG & Yiu, 2020), for each class, we choose to evaluate on
two different thresholds: 1st and 2nd percentiles of class conditional log-likelihoods of the correctly
classified training samples.
4.1 PERFORMANCE ON CLEAN TEST SETS
All the inputs are scaled in [0, 1] without normalizations, which we think is the reason that the
results reported here are slight worse than that in the original papers. Similar results to WANG &
Yiu (2020) are obtained that a rejection option help reject low-confidence test samples. Using a
higher threshold, which also implicitly rejects some legal test samples, leads to higher accuracy on
the left test sets.
Base Classifier Base Acc. SDIM-logit Acc. 1st Percentile 2nd PercentileAcc. Left Rej. Rate Acc. Left Rej. Rate
ResNet-18 95.16% 95.01% 95.64% 4.10% 96.19% 6.28%
ResNeXt-29 4× 64d 95.81% 95.24% 97.76% 4.19% 98.04% 5.85%
Table 1: Classification performances of SDIM-logit models. The second and third columns are
the accuracy of base models and derived models with SDIM-logit. For implications of using the
proposed decision function with rejection, we report the rejection rates of the test sets and the clas-
sification accuracy on the left test sets for the chosen thresholds.
4.2 EVALUATIONS ON CORRUPTED DATASET CIFAR10-C
CIFAR10-C (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019) 2 is a benchmark dataset based on CIFAR10 with
15 diverse common corruptions. Each corruption has 5 severity levels. These corruptions cause
samples to deviate from the training distribution. Results in Tab. 2 show that with the increasing of
severity level, models’ performance degrade and increasing portion of test samples will be rejected.
In general, our rejection decision function improves models’ accuracy by around 20%.
4.3 EVALUATIONS ON ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the rejection on adversarial examples generated
by L∞ Projected Gradient Descent(PGD, Madry et al. (2017)). With the increasing of epsilon (infi-
nite norm budget of adversarial perturbations), SDIM-logit models achieve higher rejection rates of
adversarial examples. In (Li et al., 2018), they use fully generative models to model the class condi-
tionals; For its strongest variant GBZ (see its Fig. 4), all the three proposed detection methods report
detection rates < 50% on even CIFAR10-binary. Note that their models can not achieve acceptable
performance on CIFAR10.
1Code of SDIM-logit: https://github.com/wangxin0716/SDIM logits.
2CIFAR10-C download URL: https://zenodo.org/record/2535967
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SDIM-logit Severity Acc. w/o Rej. (%) 1st Percentile (%) 2nd Percentile (%)Base Model Acc. Left Rej. Rate Acc. Left Rej. Rate
ResNeXt-29 4× 64d
1 87.60 97.85 29.87 98.11 32.44
2 80.79 96.58 40.32 97.00 43.00
3 73.96 95.43 48.80 96.09 51.42
4 65.97 92.70 57.05 93.81 59.56
5 54.10 84.67 67.56 86.46 69.95
mean 72.43 93.45 48.72 94.30 51.27
ResNet18
1 87.73 96.58 23.47 97.07 26.43
2 81.61 94.07 32.23 94.80 35.70
3 75.33 91.03 39.88 92.08 43.57
4 67.74 86.49 47.95 87.91 51.83
5 56.04 77.73 59.08 79.77 63.03
mean 73.69 89.18 40.52 90.32 44.11
Table 2: Classification performance of the generative classifiers derived with SDIM-logit on
CIFAR10-C. Detailed results with different severity levels (1-5, and mean), and with different deci-
sion functions are reported. The third column shows the classification accuracy of original decision
function, while the latter columns show the rejection rates and accuracies on the left test sets of our
rejection function with different thresholds.
Figure 2: Rejection (detection) rates of derived generative classifiers with rejection. Evaluations are
on Linf-PGD with epsilons  = {4/255, 6/255, 8/255}. The number of iterations is 40, and the step
size is 0.01 (same as (Li et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2017)).
4.4 OOD DETECTION
We evaluate SDIM-logit’s performance to detect OOD samples on the typical distribution pair:
CIFAR10(in)-SVHN(out), on which fully generative models like VAEs and Flows fail (Nalisnick
et al., 2018; Choi & Jang, 2018). We report better results than SDIM (see Tab. 3). This is rea-
sonable since on clean CIFAR10 test set, our SDIM-logit models(> 95%) perform better than
SDIM(∼ 92%).
Model Rejection Rate (%)1st Percentile 2nd Percentile
SDIM 94.24 95.81
SDIM-logit(ResNet-18) 98.40 98.75
SDIM-logit(ResNeXt-29 4× 64d) 98.54 98.77
Table 3: OOD detection results of SDIM-logit and SDIM on CIFAR10-SVHN distribution pair.
5
5 CONCLUSIONS
Image recognition models are trained to recognize samples of limited number of classes, thus are
no way supposed to always make predictions on all inputs in unlimited space. Being able to re-
ject what the models do not know is important for practical deployment. In this paper, we propose
SDIM-logit, which derive generative classifier given any discriminative classifier without loss of
performance. The training of SDIM-logit is computationally cheap, and the base discriminative
classifier is fixed. With SDIM-logit, classification with rejection can be performed to reject various
illegal inputs, including adversarial examples, corrupted inputs, and OOD samples. One thing to
note is that classification with rejection is complementary and orthogonal to other defense methods
aiming to improve model recognition robustness. It is promising to build more robust models by
exploring their combinations. For example, though adversarial training effectively improves adver-
sarial robustness, the adversarial accuracy so far is still not satisfying. Thus introducing a rejection
option is necessary to reduce the threaten of adversarial examples.
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